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“DON’T CONFUSE ME WITH THE FACTS”: THE USE AND
MISUSE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ON THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
WILLIAM D. BLAKE *
INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice John Roberts evoked a collective groan from social scientists during oral arguments in the Wisconsin partisan gerrymandering case,
Gill v. Whitford. 1 He argued the plaintiffs were attempting to remove reapportionment decisions “from democracy and [were] throwing them into the
courts pursuant to, and it may be simply my educational background, but I
can only describe as sociological gobbledygook.” 2 The (exasperated) plaintiff’s attorney responded, “Your Honor, this is—this is not complicated.” 3
Justice Breyer then jumped in to ask a more sympathetic question. 4
These interrogatories focused on the intelligibility of the efficiency gap,
a mathematical formula proposed by the plaintiffs to evaluate the severity of
partisan gerrymandering. 5 If Chief Justice Roberts’s characterization of the
efficiency gap was accurate, one can imagine judges needing an army of research assistants furiously writing statistical code in Stata 6 to decipher its
© 2019 William D. Blake
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Thanks
to Mark Graber for organizing the Maryland Discussion Group on Constitutionalism and to its participants for their helpful feedback. The Schmooze is, quite simply, the highlight of my work year.
The quote “Don’t confuse me with the facts” is most famously associated with Rep. Earl Landgrebe
(R-IN), a staunch Nixon supporter, explaining why he refused to support the president’s impeachment. The phrase, of course, is much older, with one version going back to the writings of Plato.
See My Mind Is Made Up. Don’t Confuse Me with the Facts, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Feb. 13, 2013),
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/13/confuse-me/#return-note-5452-10.
1. 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1611).
This quip led the American Sociological Association to write an open letter to the Chief Justice
defending social science on this and other issues that come before the Court. See Dylan Matthews,
Chief Justice John Roberts Is Now Feuding with the Entire Field of Sociology, VOX (Oct. 12, 2017,
11:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/12/16464188/john-roberts-sociological-gobbledygook-eduardo-bonilla-silva-gerrymandering. The failure of the American Political
Science Association to respond prompted an even louder groan from yours truly.
3. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 40.
4. See id. (“Can you answer the Chief Justice’s question and say the reason they lost is because if party A wins a majority of votes, party A controls the legislature. That seems fair.”).
5. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos & Eric McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).
6. Stata is a statistical software program used by researchers to manipulate and explain complex data sets. STATA, https://www.stata.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
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meaning. In reality, what seemed to baffle the Chief Justice is a simple algebraic expression, invented by a political scientist that any high school freshman should be able to calculate. 7 Earlier in oral argument, Justice Breyer
had described the efficiency gap as, “not quite so complicated as the opposition makes it think.” 8
This exchange begs the question: what explains the radically different
attitudes towards social science between these two Justices? For starters,
Chief Justice Roberts was a history major as an undergraduate, 9 while Justice
Breyer received a bachelors in PPE (philosophy, politics, and economics) at
Oxford University. 10 Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts is being honest about his
educational background in that he may be less familiar with (and therefore
less comfortable using) quantitative methods compared to Justice Breyer. Of
course, Chief Justice Roberts is also a conservative, while Justice Breyer is
more liberal in his judicial ideology. 11 Some studies indicate conservatives
express less trust in scientists than liberals. 12 The literature also indicates
people on both ends of the ideological spectrum use science to support their
underlying worldview, 13 which is what Justice Breyer did in this case. Other
studies find individuals, on the left and right, are more likely to deny the
accuracy of science that challenges their ideology, 14 much like the Chief Justice did.
Technology complicates constitutional inquiries on many issues, not
just gerrymandering, so the Court needs to be scientifically literate to evaluate them. Anecdotal evidence suggests this is not the case. Justice Antonin
Scalia refused to join part of an opinion written by fellow conservative Justice
Clarence Thomas because Justice Scalia did not agree with the statement,
7. The formula is calculated as follows: Efficiency Gap = Seat Margin – (2 × Vote Margin).
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 5, at 853. “Seat Margin” refers to the share of all seats in a
legislature held by a party minus fifty percent. Id. “Vote Margin” is the share of votes a party
received, minus fifty percent. Id. An electoral advantage exists when the efficiency gap is positive,
and a negative efficiency gap score indicates a party faces an electoral disadvantage. Id. If one
party controls redistricting and increases its efficiency gap measure in the next election, judges can
infer that legislators drew district lines to gain a partisan advantage.
8. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 12.
9. Adam Liptak, A Case for Math, Not ‘Gobbledygook,’ in Judging Partisan Voting Maps,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/us/politics/gerrymanderingmath.html.
10. See Lincoln Caplan, A Workable Democracy, HARV. MAG. (2017), https://harvardmagazine.com/2017/03/a-workable-democracy.
11. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 318–20 (2007).
12. Michael A. Cacciatore et al., Opposing Ends of the Spectrum: Exploring Trust in Scientific
and Religious Authorities, 27 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 11, 19 (2016).
13. Feng Shi et al., Millions of Online Book Co-purchases Reveal Partisan Differences in the
Consumption of Science, 1 NAT. HUM. BEHAV. 79 (2017).
14. Anthony N. Washburn & Linda J. Skitka, Science Denial Across the Political Divide: Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science, 1 SOC.
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 2 (2017) (finding individuals on the left and right are similarly
motivated to discount scientific claims that challenge their worldview).
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“Genes form the basis for hereditary traits in living organisms.” 15 In debates
over whether the death penalty deters crime, Professor John Donohue said,
“Scalia was willing to cite work that was thoroughly refuted by an accepted
scholarly institution, without feeling any need to buttress his position,” while
rejecting the most rigorous research on the subject. 16
Justice William Brennan outlined a hypothesis as to why Justices may
not be the best consumers of scientific information: “It is unrealistic to expect
either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors
of experimental or statistical technique.” 17 Justice Brennan, unlike Justice
Scalia, was a judicial liberal who majored in economics, 18 and he cited social
science in more opinions than any other Justice in the last sixty years. 19 Ironically, however, when Justice Brennan issued this warning about judicial
competencies concerning statistics, he proceeded to misstate a key scientific
finding about gender, age, and the tendency to drink and drive. 20
This Article moves beyond the anecdotal and presents a more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative account of social science in Supreme
Court decisions. To set the stage, Part I will provide a brief narrative of the
role of social science in Supreme Court decisions from the Lochner Era
through Brown v. Board of Education. 21 While it would be tempting to conclude that social science evidence helped progressive advocates overturn
conservative economic and civil rights precedents, the history is more complicated. As the social sciences became increasingly quantitative in their approach, Justices, who usually lack statistical training, 22 are more likely to
question the utility of social science. The Court also used junk science to
justify their decisions, and this problem predates the rise of quantitative methodology.

15. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013). As
Justice Scalia wrote, “I am unable to affirm [the fine details of molecular biology] on my own
knowledge or even my own belief.” Id. at 596 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
16. Emily Bazelon, Antonin Scalia Didn’t Trust Science, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/21/magazine/the-lives-they-lived-antoninscalia.html.
17. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
18. Clement E. Vose, The National Consumers’ League and the Brandeis Brief, 1 MIDWEST J.
POL. SCI. 267, 277 (1957).
19. See infra Table 2, Section II.B.
20. See infra notes 112–118 and accompanying text.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. The exception to this might be Justice Harry Blackmun, who was a math major at Harvard
University. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. Perhaps not so coincidentally, Justice
Blackmun cited social science at the fifth highest rate among the thirty-four Justices included in my
sample. See Table 2 infra Section II.B.
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Part III will consider the competing incentives for Justices to make appeals to science, blending insights from the major theories of judicial behavior in political science. To test this theory, I collected an original dataset of
Supreme Court citations to social science studies from the Warren Court
through today. A series of multivariate logistic regression analyses indicates
scientific references are more likely to appear in salient cases. Justices who
majored in a scientific discipline as an undergraduate are more likely to cite
social science than others.
Moreover, liberal Justices are significantly more likely to cite social science research than conservatives. The relationship between social science
and judicial behavior is not just partisan; it is polarizing. The data indicate
Justices on the Court’s left are more likely to invoke science in order to justify
a liberal opinion, while Justices on the right are more likely to invoke science
to justify a conservative opinion. The polarizing effect of social science references is even stronger in dissenting opinions. This Article will conclude
by considering the normative implications of the findings and the need for
future research.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SUPREME COURT
OPINIONS
The conventional account of social science influencing Supreme Court
decisions typically begins with the “Brandeis Brief” in Muller v. Oregon. 23
The traditional narrative emphasizes how science provided objective evidence that mediated the desire of a conservative Court to uphold liberty of
contract. The next major chapter in the relationship between social science
and judicial decisionmaking focuses on Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of
Education. 24 Here again, we are made to think that social science provided
objective evidence for progressive reformers to advance their agenda.
In this Section, I point out several flaws in this narrative. First, it ignores
how poorly constructed many of these scientific studies were. Junk science
sometimes caused progressive reformers to enact policies contrary to their
stated goals, as in the case of the electric chair providing a more “humane”
form of execution. Conservatives also used racist pseudo-science to persuade
the Court to uphold segregation. Most importantly, it fails to account for the
confusion and skepticism towards social science that many Supreme Court
Justices have expressed in more recent times. I build on previous scholarship
that argues that the New Deal changed both the priorities of the American
state and the social sciences. As quantitative methods became the dominant

23. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). For a revisionist account of the role of the Brandeis Brief, see Noga
Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and the Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 59 (2013).
24. 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
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mode of analysis within the social sciences, judges became less able to evaluate the accuracy and usefulness of the science they cite.
A. The Brandeis (-Goldmark-Frankfurter) Brief(s) During the Lochner
Era
According to the familiar story of the Brandeis Brief, the invalidation of
a law regulating work hours for bakers in Lochner v. New York 25 forced progressive advocates to adopt a new strategy to overcome liberty of contract
objections. Three years after Lochner, a challenge to a ten-hour workday law
for women reached the Court. The state of Oregon turned to the National
Consumers’ League and its lead counsel, Louis Brandeis to argue the case.
The brief Brandeis submitted, which was researched and written in about one
month, 26 contained two pages of legal argument followed by 111 more pages
of “new empirical evidence.” 27
Brandeis also relied on the scientific evidence from his brief in a command performance during oral argument. According to one observer,
“[Brandeis] not only reached the Court but he dwarfed the Court, because it
was clear that here stood a man who knew infinitely more, and who cared
infinitely more, for the vital daily rights of the people than the men who sat
there sworn to protect them.” 28 The strategy paid off. The Court unanimously upheld the Oregon statute and expressed admiration for the information contained in the brief. 29 The Court’s decision in Muller is consistent
with modern political science research, which finds amicus curiae briefs are
influential because they provide Justices with information they otherwise
would not have when deciding a case. 30
Perhaps Brandeis received his inspiration for this litigation strategy
from Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Lochner. Justice Harlan’s dissent, unlike that of Justice Holmes, recognized the legitimacy of liberty of
contract. Justice Harlan, however, disagreed with the majority over whether
the New York Bakeshop Act served a legitimate public purpose. Justice Har-

25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
26. Vose, supra note 18, at 277.
27. JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY : A STUDY IN INDUSTRY 252 (1912).
28. Vose, supra note 18, at 280 (citing William Hitz to Felix Frankfurter, National Consumer
League Papers (Dec. 1914)).
29. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908) (Brewer, J.) (“It may not be amiss . . . to notice
the course of legislation as well as expressions of opinion from other than judicial sources. In the
brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, for the defendant in error, is a very copious collection of all
these matters . . . .”).
30. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807 (2004).
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lan believed bakers faced dangerous working conditions, relying on data provided in Professor Ludwig Hirt’s Diseases of the Workers. 31 Bakers, according to Hirt, were “pale-faced” because they endured “intense heat,” and exposure to flour dust caused “inflammation of the lungs” and “running eyes.” 32
Hirt concluded, “The labor of the bakers is among the hardest and most laborious imaginable . . . .”33 None of this information was provided to the
Court in New York’s brief.
If otherwise conservative Justices were willing to uphold laws backed
by social science evidence, why did New York refuse to utilize this strategy
in Lochner? Legal historian Paul Kens blames New York Attorney General
Julius Mayer for being incompetent. 34 Professor Noga Morag-Levine, on the
other hand, offers a more systematic explanation: the Court had traditionally
deferred to legislative judgments about how a state chooses to exercise its
police powers. 35 For example, in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, 36 the
Court refused to question the wisdom of granting a monopoly to one New
Orleans slaughterhouse. The state legislature enacted the law as a response
to cholera outbreaks caused by animal remains that infected the city’s water
supply. 37 Attorney General Mayer thought he would enjoy the same benefit
of the doubt in Lochner. 38
The typical account of the Brandeis Brief is incomplete in four important respects. First, it belies the true authorship of the brief itself. While
Brandeis deserves credit for adopting the strategy of providing scientific evidence, he did not conduct the research. 39 Justice Brewer should have paid
homage to Brandeis’ sister-in-law, Josephine Goldmark, for the thoroughness of the Muller brief. 40 Goldmark, who served as chairman of the

31. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 70–71 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing LUDWIG
HIRT, DISEASES OF THE WORKERS (1871)).
32. Id. at 70 (quoting LUDWIG HIRT, DISEASES OF THE WORKER (1871)).
33. Id. (quoting LUDWIG HIRT, DISEASES OF THE WORKER (1871)).
34. See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 112–13
(1998).
35. Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 87.
36. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
37. See Andrew Hamm, Barnett on Original Meaning and the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
SCOTUSBLOG, (Nov. 5, 2015 2:43 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/barnett-on-originalmeaning-and-the-privileges-and-immunities-clause/ (describing a lecture delivered by Professor
Randy Barnett to the Supreme Court Historical Society).
38. Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 85–88.
39. It is also inaccurate to give Brandeis credit for inventing this strategy. Most of the studies
cited in the brief came from Europe, especially Great Britain, where reformers faced similar libertarian opposition to labor legislation. Scientific evidence reassured lawmakers that protecting workers was necessary for the public good, as opposed to paternalism or class-based rent-seeking.
Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 88–93.
40. See Vose, supra note 18, at 283 (noting Goldmark’s name did not appear on the Muller
brief but was included (as second author) on the League’s subsequent briefs).
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League’s Committee on Legislation, 41 supervised a staff of readers who
scoured several libraries looking for relevant evidence, which she subsequently summarized and synthesized. 42
Second, the term “Brandeis Brief” incorrectly suggests the National
Consumers’ League only utilized this strategy once and for the sole benefit
of the Court. In reality, the League produced similar briefs in more than a
dozen state and federal cases, nine of which reached the United States Supreme Court. 43 The League continued to produce (even longer) briefs that
were heavy on science and light on law long past Justice Louis Brandeis’s
1916 appointment to the Supreme Court. Felix Frankfurter then took over as
the League’s lead counsel. The League also viewed its briefs as an opportunity to engage with a wider audience regarding the need for progressive
reform. It sought grant funding to finance donations of its briefs to lawyers
and university libraries. 44 The League’s brief in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital ran to 1138 pages and cost nearly $7000 to print several hundred copies! 45
Third, the scientific information included in the Muller brief would not
be considered reliable by modern standards. The brief typically included
short, conclusory statements made by doctors and other experts without much
context as to the study’s design. These statements were often sweeping in
their assessment yet lacking in specificity. Here is a typical example from a
British physician, “The most common effect I have noticed of the long hours
is general deterioration of health; very general symptoms which we medically
attribute to over-action, and debility of the nervous system; that includes a
great deal more than what is called nervous disease, such as indigestion, constipation, a general slackness, and a great many other indefinite symptoms.” 46
The problem with substandard science is that it may provide a false justification for a legal conclusion. Consider Progressive-era reforms to the
death penalty. In 1898, New York became the first state to mandate the use
of the electric chair, following several botched hangings in the 1880s. Dr.
Albert Southwick lobbied intensely for the law as a more humanitarian

41. Id. at 269.
42. Id. at 278.
43. Id. at 277 n.18 (citing Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Radice
v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Stettler v.
O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917); Bosley v.
McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); Hawley v. Walker, 232
U.S. 718 (1914) (per curiam); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Gainer v. Dohrman, S.F. No.
10, 990, Sup. Ct. Calif. (1924); People v. Elerding, 98 N.E. 982 (Ill. 1912); Ritchie v. Wayman, 91
N.E. 695 (Ill. 1910); People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1915)).
44. Id. at 287–88; Morag-Levine, supra note 23, at 92–93.
45. Vose, supra note 18, at 281.
46. Brief for Defendant in Error at 18–19, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107)
(quoting REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE ON SHOPS EARLY CLOSING BILL, BRITISH HOUSE OF
COMMONS 215 (1895)).
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method of execution. 47 The only evidence Dr. Southwick could offer in support of his conclusion was that he had witnessed the accidental death of a
man who had touched electrical wires. 48
William Kemmler, the first person to be sentenced to death by electrocution, brought an Eighth Amendment challenge. 49 Thomas Edison testified
at trial that a shock of 1000 volts of alternating current “would kill instantly,
painlessly and in every case.” Edison admitted he was not an expert on bioelectricity, but his celebrity was more than persuasive. 50 According to one
legal historian, Edison’s assertion was “sufficient evidence of its truth.” 51
When Kemmler’s case reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Fuller
wrote a unanimous opinion upholding the law. 52 As in the Slaughterhouse
Cases, the Court deferred to the judgment of the New York Legislature. 53
Any notion that the electric chair provided an instant, painless death was disproved immediately to any witness of Kemmler’s execution, which lasted
eight horrific minutes. 54 As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, many
other inmates suffered similarly gruesome fates on the electric chair over the
next century. 55
Finally, the traditional myth assumes only progressives marshaled social science to advance their agenda. 56 In 1908 (the same year as Muller), the
Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky law that mandated segregation in private
schools. 57 Berea College, the only racially integrated university in the state,
challenged the law on the grounds it interfered with its freedom of contract. 58

47. Philip R. Nugent, Pulling the Plug on the Electric Chair: The Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 185, 190 (1993). Ironically, while science now supports
the notion that electrocution is a painful, undignified way to die, opposition to the New York law
came from those who thought the electric chair would undermine the dignity of science! Nicholas
Ruddick, Life and Death by Electricity in 1890: The Transfiguration of William Kemmler, 21 J. AM.
CULTURE 79, 80 (1998) (quoting an 1890 edition of Scientific American that opined it would be a
“degradation of the noble science of electricity if it were brought down to so base a use as the killing
of criminals”).
48. Nugent, supra note 47, at 190.
49. Id. at 190–91.
50. Id. at 191.
51. Id. at 191–92.
52. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
53. Id. at 447.
54. For a graphic description of Kemmler’s demise, see Ruddick, supra note 47, at 83–86.
55. CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN UNNATURAL AMERICAN HISTORY (2016).
56. See also PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL ix–xv (2008) (describing the use of eugenics as scientific
“evidence” in forced sterilization cases).
57. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
58. See Hans J. Hacker & William D. Blake, The Neutrality Principle: The Hidden Yet Powerful Legal Axiom at Work in Brown versus Board of Education, 8 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. &
POL’Y 5, 18–20 (2006).
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Kentucky countered that the law was needed to protect public health and
safety under its police powers. 59
The State relied on a pseudo-scientific study that claimed black people
were inherently less intelligent than white people. Dr. Sanford B. Hunt
reached this conclusion on the basis that the average black person’s brain
weighed five ounces less than that of the average white person. 60 The brief
also cited an 1867 Pennsylvania Supreme Court segregation opinion, which
stated, “The natural separation of the races is therefore an undeniable fact,
and all social organizations which lead to their amalgamation are repugnant
to the law of nature. From social amalgamation it is but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage.” 61
Outside of the context of race, the Lochner Era Court became increasingly skeptical of whether state legislation achieved a constitutionally valid
purpose. Similarly, the Court frequently doubted whether federal economic
regulations were legitimately related to the Commerce Clause 62 or Taxing
and Spending Clause. 63 In 1937, after President Roosevelt threatened to pack
the Court, 64 the Justices reversed course, upholding a Washington minimum
wage law for women 65 and the National Labor Relations Act. 66
A year later, the Court went even further in redefining its role within the
American constitutional system. In United States v. Carolene Products
59. Id. at 20–21.
60. Id. at 20.
61. West Chester P.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 213 (1867).
62. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal ban on child
labor).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down key provisions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act on states-rights grounds). Butler represents the one major pre-New
Deal economic decision not overruled in a subsequent case following the Revolution of 1937. Instead, the Court distinguished Butler when it upheld the legitimacy of the Social Security Act in
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis. 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (holding “[t]he excise is not void as
involving the coercion of the States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment”). Federal power
appeared to circumscribe state authority in United States v. Darby, when the Court held the Tenth
Amendment does not deprive “the national government of authority to resort to all means for the
exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.” 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941). However, Darby was a Commerce Clause case, and this principle was never
extended to the Taxing and Spending Clause. As a result, I contend Butler and Steward Machine
Co. formed the jurisprudential basis for the states’ rights revival under the Rehnquist and Roberts
Courts. For example, Chief Justice Roberts relies heavily on Steward Machine Co.’s distinction
between the federal government’s ability to pressure (not coerce) the states to strike the Medicaid
provisions of the Affordable Care Act. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519,
580–87 (2012); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 292 (1993) (“[T]he unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be abandoned. . . . During the difficult transition from the
common law system to the modern state, the doctrine represented an awkward and never fully explicated effort to protect constitutional rights in a dramatically different environment.”).
64. Barry Cushman, Inside the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937, SUP. CT. REV. 367, 381
(2016).
65. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
66. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Co., 67 the Court upheld a federal law banning the interstate shipment of
“filled milk”—milk mixed with other oils or compounds. 68 According to
Footnote 4 of the opinion, “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”
may demand “searching judicial inquiry.” 69 However, Justice Stone argued
courts should be more deferential to elected officials in other types of cases.
“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions,” Justice Stone wrote, “is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.” 70 Footnote 4, thus, represented
a reversal of the Court’s Lochner Era approach to economic rights and
formed the basis for the Court’s modern scrutiny system in constitutional review cases.
B. Post-New Deal Developments in Law and Social Science
Why did the Supreme Court become more deferential when evaluating
economic regulations? One could argue that the modern rational basis test
was not so modern, as it marked a return to the Court’s pre-Lochner Era jurisprudence. 71 Professor Bruce Ackerman, on the other hand, has argued
Footnote 4 was an important part of the New Deal constitutional revolution,
expanding the legitimate reach of the federal government. 72 Arguably, the
Court’s new jurisprudence was also a function of its new personnel. By 1938,
two of the conservative “Four Horsemen,” 73 Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland, had retired and were replaced by pro-New Deal Justices Hugo Black
and Stanley Reed.
I contend this jurisprudential shift also represents a new judicial understanding of the complexity of social problems and the institutional competencies required to solve them. Footnote 4 recognized that judges lacked the
training to diagnose economic problems and evaluate potential solutions to
them. The executive and legislative branches are large enough to hire policy
experts who can leverage social science effectively. For policy advice, Roo-

67. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
68. Id. at 145 n.1.
69. Id. at 153 n.4.
70. Id. at 152.
71. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
72. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE : FOUNDATIONS 120 (1991) (“Carolene should be
numbered amongst the transformative opinions which the modern republic uses to memorialize the
constitutional solutions of the 1930’s.”).
73. See BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION : THE COURT-P ACKING FIGHT AND THE
TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 49 (2009).
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sevelt famously relied on his “brain trust”: Raymond Moley (a political economist and law professor), Rex Tugwell (an economics professor), and Adolph
Berle (a lawyer and business professor). 74
As the Supreme Court reoriented itself to post-New Deal America, so
did the social sciences. This Article focuses mostly on developments within
political science, but other scholars have described similar transformations
across related disciplines. 75 At the beginning of the twentieth century, political scientists valued scholarship not simply for its own sake, but as a tool to
solve real-world political problems. Research within the discipline often
demonstrated “that the . . . system as set forth in the law is not always the
same as the actual system.” 76
The reform-oriented mission of political science attracted both university professors and educated laypeople. When the American Political Science Association launched in 1903, only twenty percent of its members were
“professors and teachers.” 77 Elected officials also sought out political scientists for advice. For example, President Roosevelt settled on court packing
as a response to the Supreme Court’s opposition to the New Deal after extensive consultations with Princeton University Professor Edward Corwin. 78
Beginning in the 1920s, some political scientists began protesting
against the dominant research tradition, using historical and other interpretivist methods to describe and analyze how governing institutions do and
should function. They sought to redefine the object of political science as
“formulating and testing hypotheses, concerning uniformities of behavior in
different institutional settings.” 79 To accomplish this goal, according to a

74. ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT : A P OLITICAL LIFE 117–19 (2017). Not that
elected officials always make decisions using considered scientific judgment. On one occasion in
1933, President Roosevelt told Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau he wanted to raise gold prices
by twenty-one cents. When Morgenthau inquired why, Roosevelt replied, “Because ‘three times
seven’ is a lucky number.” Id. at 174. Political scientists have noted that decisions like these continue to this day. BRYAN D. JONES & WALTER WILLIAMS, THE P OLITICS OF BAD IDEAS: THE
GREAT TAX CUT DELUSION AND THE DECLINE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA v–vi (2008).
75. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 390 (1991) (“The
sciences of liberal change that were forged during the second decade of [the twentieth] century
captured substantial support in social science disciplines. . . . The self-conscious search for scientific method . . . transformed the larger disciplinary traditions.”); B.F. Skinner, Behaviorism at Fifty,
140 SCIENCE 951, 957 (1963) (discussing how “psychology has long been used for purposes of
explanation” across the social sciences.).
76. ROSS, supra note 75, at 274 (quoting FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT (1905)).
77. Theodore J. Lowi, The State in Political Science: How We Become What We Study, 86 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1992) (quoting ALBERT SOMIT & JOSEPH TANNENHAUS, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE : FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM 55 (1967)).
78. SOLOMON, supra note 73, at 90.
79. Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument
to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763, 764 (1961) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (1945)). Within political science,
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1951 publication, a political behavioralist should seek answers to questions
“in quantitative terms if [they] can and in qualitative terms if [they] must.” 80
While statistical theory was well-developed by the late nineteenth century, 81
post-World War II technological advances made it easier (and cheaper) for
political scientists to analyze larger datasets with more advanced statistical
techniques. 82
Political scientist Theodore Lowi poses another rationale for behavioralism becoming dominant: it co-evolved with the New Deal. “Science is an
inherent part of the new, bureaucratized state,” Lowi argued, because of the
post-New Deal commitment to making policy based on “scientific decision
making.” 83 Within political science, Lowi argued that the subfields of political behavior, public policy, and formal theory became increasingly popular
because of their “compatibility with bureaucratic thought-ways.” 84 These
disciplinary and governance changes required a commitment to quantitative
methods because, as Professor Karl Manheim wrote, “Bureaucratic thought
is permeated by measurement.” 85
The post-New Deal approaches to social science and law famously intersected in Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education. 86 Chief Justice
Warren included the footnote in support of his conclusion, “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” 87 Although this footnote subsequently became a major source of controversy, 88 Chief Justice Warren said
he included it as merely an afterthought. 89 This rationale is entirely plausible.
As noted in Part II of this Article, Brown v. Board of Education is the only
opinion in which Chief Justice Warren cites social scientific research. 90 The
behavioralists study, among other phenomena, why individuals join political parties, vote for candidates, and hold opinions on political issues. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF P OLITICAL
BEHAVIOR (Russell J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 2009).
80. Dahl, supra note 79, at 767–68 (emphasis omitted) (quoting David Truman, Items, SOC.
SCI. RES. COUNCIL 37 (1951)).
81. Lowi, supra note 77, at 3.
82. John M. Chambers, Statistical Computing: History and Trends, 34 AM . STAT’N 238, 238
(1980) (“[R]adically cheaper and smaller devices for processing and memory . . . are certain to provide major opportunities and challenges for the use of computers in statistics.”).
83. Lowi, supra note 77, at 3.
84. Id. Formal theory refers to the use of game theory as a method to derive hypotheses under
rationalistic assumptions. See Paul E. Johnson, Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science, 12 MATHEMATICAL AND COMPUTER MODELLING 397 (1989).
85. Lowi, supra note 77, at 3 (quoting KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 167 (1936)).
86. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
87. Id. at 495.
88. See Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the
Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 803–14 (2002) (describing the ongoing controversy over Footnote 11).
89. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE : THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 706 (2004) (noting Warren later incredulously
stated, “It was only a note, after all.”).
90. See infra Table 2, Section II.B.
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footnote consisted of seven references to studies conducted by both white and
black scholars. Two of the references were surveys of social scientists who
largely agreed segregation harms the development of black students. 91
Most prominently, Footnote 11 included two references to the studies
(the “Doll Studies”) conducted by Dr. Kenneth Clark, a City University of
New York psychologist. 92 Dr. Clark interviewed male and female black children between the ages of three and seven. Each child viewed two otherwise
identical infant dolls, one of which was white, the other black. Dr. Clark
requested the children show him a doll that matched a qualification, including
“the doll you like best,” the “nice doll,” the doll that “looks bad,” and the doll
that “looks like you.” Across each age group, children were significantly
more likely to associate the white doll with positive characteristics and the
black doll with looking “bad.” 93
The notoriety Footnote 11 has achieved makes its origin story even more
interesting. 94 When the NAACP was preparing to bring Brown to the Court,
they approached Dr. Clark for assistance in grounding their legal argument
in social science data. 95 The NAACP wanted to counter Justice Brown’s observation in Plessy v. Ferguson 96 that segregation only creates a badge of
inferiority if “the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.” 97 Dr.
Clark’s research could, as he put it, “demonstrate subtle or psychological
damage to black youngsters from segregation.” 98 The Appendix to the
NAACP’s briefs analyzed data from forty-nine studies conducted by Dr.
Clark and many other scientists. 99
That educational segregation existed in Topeka, Kansas, was easy to diagnose, as there was a state statute requiring separate school systems. 100 In
subsequent cases, states and school boards seeking to avoid compliance with
91. 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (citing Isidor Chein, What Are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT’L J. OPINION & ATTITUDE RES. 229–34 (1949);
Max Deutscher & Isidor Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of
Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948)).
92. Id. (citing KENNETH B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950)).
93. Darlene Powell-Hopson & Derek S. Hopson, Implications of Doll Color Preferences
Among Black Preschool Children and White Preschool Children, 14 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 57, 58
(1988).
94. E.g., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 50–51 (Jack Balkin
ed., 2001).
95. MARK A. CHESLER, JOSEPH SANDERS & DEBRA S. KALMUSS, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT :
MOBILIZING EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 17–19 (1988).
96. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97. Id. at 551.
98. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 95, at 19.
99. Appendix to Appellants’ Briefs at 20–24, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(Nos. 8, 101, 191).
100. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 486 n.1.
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Brown became more sophisticated in hiding their discriminatory acts. Consequently, plaintiffs relied on more complex statistics to prove their case. As
part of the decree to integrate public schools in Washington, D.C., the plaintiffs asked the court to equalize the per-pupil spending on every item in the
school budget. 101 Both the plaintiff and the school board hired economists to
argue whether neighborhood income in the city was positively or negatively
correlated with school expenditures. The answer depended upon which statistical technique was employed: Pearson correlation or Spearman correlation. 102
Judge J. Skelly Wright became increasingly frustrated with the scientific
data debated in the lawsuit. When he issued his opinion, he declared, “[T]he
unfortunate if inevitable tendency has been to lose sight of the disadvantaged
young students on whose behalf this suit was first brought in an overgrown
garden of numbers and charts and jargon like ‘standard deviation of the variable,’ statistical ‘significance,’ and ‘Pearson product moment correlations.’” 103 Instead, Judge Wright stated, “The conclusion I reach is based
upon burden of proof, and upon straightforward moral and constitutional
arithmetic.” 104 Constitutional arithmetic may seem straightforward to some
judges, but debates over appropriate statistical techniques in the social sciences today are even more complex than which form of a correlation coefficient an analyst should employ.
C. Judicial Misunderstanding of Science and the Potential for
Ideologically-Motivated Reasoning
Josephine Goldmark, Justice Louis Brandeis, and Justice Felix Frankfurter wanted to mediate the Lochner Court’s conservatism, using scientific
101. Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
102. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL P OLICY 126 (1977). A correlation coefficient measures the extent to which two variables tend to change together. Correlation values of
one or negative one signify a perfect (positive or negative) relationship between the two variables,
regardless of whether an analysis uses the Pearson or Spearman technique. A Pearson correlation
evaluates the linear relationship between two continuous variables, whereas a Spearman correlation
evaluates a monotonic relationship between two continuous variables. A monotonic relationship is
one in which the variables tend to change together, but not necessarily at a constant rate. To illustrate the difference, consider a series of data points along a J-shape that look like this . There is no
way to accurately fit a straight line through that symbol so the Pearson correlation would be slightly
less than one. The Spearman correlation, however, would be one because a J-shaped line would fit
the J-shaped data more accurately. One advantage of the Spearman correlation is that it is less
sensitive to outlier data points because it has more flexibility in the patterns it measures. However,
since most quantitative research in social science is based on finding linear relationships between
variables, Pearson correlations are more commonly used. For a more mathematically rigorous explanation of the similarities and differences of these two concepts, see KATHLEEN F. WEAVER ET
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN RESEARCH: W ITH APPLICATIONS IN THE
BIOLOGICAL AND LIFE SCIENCES 435–71 (2018).
103. Hobson, 327 F. Supp. at 859.
104. Id.
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evidence to steer the Justices to a legally correct (liberal) outcome in labor
cases. History has demonstrated, however, that as quantitative social science
becomes more methodologically rigorous, it becomes more likely that
judges, who lack statistical training, may be unable to evaluate the quality of
the research they cite. Moreover, judges may not understand whether the
scientific findings support the legal conclusions they draw from them. 105 If
these mistakes occur frequently, social science is unlikely to have this mediating effect on judicial decisionmaking. Instead, social science could become
another tool fueling ideological polarization on the Court. 106
Chief Justice Warren is arguably guilty of making both types of mistakes in Footnote 11. Even by the scientific standards of the mid-twentieth
century, the research cited in Brown was not particularly well-designed. For
example, surveying social scientists about their views on segregation is not
nearly as helpful as administering a survey to black (and white) children.
Other social scientists criticized the question wording and sampling procedures of these surveys. 107
Dr. Clark’s Doll Studies suffered from a small sample size and no control group. 108 It is also possible that Dr. Clark over-concluded from his data.
For example, only sixty-one percent of the three-year-old respondents correctly identified the brown doll as the one that “looks like you.” 109 If nearly
half the sample cannot relate their skin color to the skin color of the doll,
what does it mean when these children associate the white doll as being “the
nice doll”?
More importantly, Justice Warren cited this research in support of the
proposition that state-sanctioned discrimination psychologically harms black
children. However, the Doll Studies did not identify the causal mechanism
that creates this lack of self-esteem. Other research undermined the assumption that state-mandated segregation created this effect. An earlier Doll Study
conducted by Dr. Clark compared the behavior of black children in Arkansas
to those in Massachusetts, where de jure school segregation did not exist. 110
The black children in Massachusetts were even more likely to prefer the
white doll than the children in Arkansas. 111

105. See also Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91 (1993).
106. For a persuasive account on the rise of ideological polarization on the Court, see NEAL
DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW P ARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO
THE SUPREME COURT 1–14 (2019).
107. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 95, at 23.
108. Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 279, 293–94 (2004).
109. Powell-Hopson & Hopson, supra note 93, at 58.
110. CHESLER ET AL., supra note 95, at 23.
111. Id.
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Even Justices who enjoy engaging with science may badly misinterpret
it. According to a former law clerk, Justice William Brennan had a “certain
fascination with science and technology,” 112 and he cited scientific studies in
more opinions than any other Justice analyzed in this Article. 113 Nonetheless,
his enthusiasm did not serve him well in Craig v. Boren, 114 a challenge to an
Oklahoma law that set the legal age for purchasing so-called “3.2% beer” at
eighteen for women and twenty-one for men. The State justified the law as
a means of reducing drunk driving and highway accidents, but the Court invalidated the law on Equal Protection grounds by a 7-2 vote.
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion doubted both the accuracy and relevance of scientific evidence the State offered in defense of the law. 115 Regarding the most relevant scientific information, Justice Brennan wrote,
[T]he statistics broadly establish that [0].18% of females and 2%
of males [aged eighteen to twenty years old in the state of Oklahoma] were arrested for [driving under the influence of alcohol in
September-December, 1973]. While such a disparity is not trivial
in a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment
of a gender line as a classifying device. Certainly[,] if maleness is
to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2%
must be considered an unduly tenuous “fit.” 116
Justice Brennan made three major mistakes in this passage. First of all,
there is no correlational analysis taking place, so the term “correlation” is not
appropriate. Second, he mistakes the concepts of statistical significance,
which tests whether a finding is a “statistical fluke” caused by measurement
error, for substantive significance, which evaluates whether a finding has
real-world import. 117 Finally, the substantive significance of the difference
in arrest rates for men and women is massive, not merely “not trivial.” Ironically, Justice Rehnquist, who cites science in only 0.7 percent of his opinions, 118 provides a much better interpretation of this finding in his dissent:
“[M]ales in the [eighteen to twenty year old] age group were arrested for

112. Dean M. Hashimoto, Justice Brennan’s Use of Scientific and Empirical Evidence in Constitutional and Administrative Law, 32 B.C. L. REV. 739, 740 (1991).
113. See infra Table 2, Section II.B.
114. 429 U.S. 1904 (1976).
115. Id. at 199–204.
116. Id. at 201–02.
117. In Craig, one cannot conclude whether the gender difference in arrest rates is statistically
significant because, without additional information from other time periods, we do not know if the
arrest data from September to December 1973 was anomalous. For a more detailed explanation of
the difference between the concepts of statistical and substantive significance, see Herbert F. Weisberg, Substantive Significance, in 3 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
METHODS 1099 (Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman & Tim Futing Liao eds., 2004).
118. See infra Table 2, Section II.B.

232

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:216

‘driving under the influence’ almost [eighteen] times as often as their female
counterparts.”119
Justice Brennan formed a bizarre conclusion concerning the limitations
of the State’s data. He claimed the higher arrest rate for men aged eighteen
to twenty years old may be evidence of “the relative futility of controlling
driving behavior by the 3.2% beer statute and like legislation.” 120 This seems
equivalent to saying that since men are disproportionately more likely to be
arrested for committing murder, 121 the laws punishing murder are futile, and,
by extension, raise Equal Protection concerns. Moreover, it is puzzling as to
why Justice Brennan would spend several pages critiquing the State’s data
before stating, “It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or
state officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical
technique.” 122
Professor Ronald Dworkin echoed this perspective towards quantitative
data in judicial opinions. 123 However, he also argued judges should rely on
qualitative studies in their decisionmaking. He noted, “Controversial causal
judgments based on statistical theory lie outside the normal competence of
courts . . . . But the role of interpretive judgment should not be reduced.” 124
Judges, Dworkin argued, are well-positioned to understand the quality and
implications of an anthropology study that, for example, evaluates whether a
rain dance in an indigenous tribe “is religious rather than technological in its
meaning.” 125
Dworkin hoped to recreate the relationship between social science and
judging that existed when Goldmark, Justice Brandeis, and Justice Frankfurter were writing their briefs. This plea failed to recognize that one cannot go
home again. Absent a social scientific revolution that reinvigorates qualitative methods as the dominant form of scholarship (or a revolution in legal
education), 126 using social science in judicial decisions will be fraught with

119. Craig, 429 U.S. at 223 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. James Alan Fox & Emma E. Fridel, Gender Differences in Patterns and Trends in U.S.
Homicide, 1976-2015, 4 VIOLENCE & GENDER 37, 37–43 (2017).
122. 429 U.S. at 204.
123. Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 3, 12 (1977).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 4. The concept of judges-as-anthropologists plays a major role in Dworkin’s subsequent work on constructivist legal theory. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–86 (1986).
126. Such a revolution would be welcomed by some legal commentators. OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES JR., THE P ATH OF THE LAW 28 (2007) (“For the rational study of the law the blackletter
man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master
of economics.”); Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113,
1129 (1981) (“Leading law schools should seek to foster social scientific research on the legal system . . . .”).
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empirical and normative difficulties. As discussed in the next section, ordinary citizens do not fully understand how the scientific method works. This
lack of understanding creates a willingness to support only those scientific
conclusions that comport with their political worldview. If judges are similarly “in over their heads” when it comes to evaluating social science, they
may fall victim to the same kind of ideologically-motivated reasoning.
II. USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO PREDICT THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Why might Supreme Court Justices make scientific appeals? This Part
considers different incentives that make some Justices more likely to reference scientific studies than others and make some cases more likely to feature
scientific appeals. Finally, this Part considers whether science might polarize
or mediate the effect of ideology on judicial decisionmaking. The major theories of judicial behavior within political science inform the development of
these hypotheses. Section II.A discusses the three major theories of judicial
behavior: (1) the attitudinal model; (2) the strategic model; and (3) the legal
model. The attitudinal model forms the basis for the “Judicial Liberalism
Hypothesis” and “Science Major Hypothesis.” The strategic model of judicial behavior yields the “Case Salience Hypothesis” and the “Ideological Polarization Hypothesis,” while the “Ideological Moderation Hypothesis” derives from the legal model. Finally, Section II.B, provides background on
the data gathered to test these hypotheses.
A. Theory and Hypotheses
1. The Attitudinal Model of Judicial Decisionmaking
The behavioral revolution, described in Section I.B, took hold more
quickly in some subfields of political science than others. The last to embrace
the behavioral approach was public law. Professor Harold Spaeth complained about the state of scientific research on the Court in the mid-1960s,
arguing, “Until recent years, analysis of Supreme Court . . . decision-making
had hewed exclusively to the line of literary criticism; it was subjective, impressionistic, and nonreplicable.” 127 Spaeth, along with Professor Jeffrey
127. HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT : CASES AND COMMENTARY 15 (1966). Ironically, the attitudinal model that Professor Harold Spaeth eventually developed along with Professor
Jeffrey Segal is subject to the same criticisms. In many cases, classifying a particular opinion as
“liberal or conservative” is quite subjective, and the initial measure of judicial ideology proposed
by attitudinalists is based on the subjective interpretations of newspaper commentators. JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
321–24 (2002). Second, the attitudinal model does not claim ideology is one important variable in
explaining judicial decisions. Segal and Spaeth instead claim ideology is the only relevant variable.
Id. at 324–25 (“[I]n predicting votes, one is clearly better off knowing the attitudes of the [J]ustices
than the facts of the case.”). Any statistical model in which only one independent variable predicts
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Segal, developed the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, which assumes
Justices are single-minded seekers of legal policy. Each Justice’s ideology
determines what kind of legal policy they seek. 128 Segal and Spaeth, writing
in 2002, conclude, “Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he
is extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall voted the way he did because
he was extremely liberal.” 129
The attitudinal model suggests rival hypotheses when it comes to the
relationship between a Justice’s ideology and his or her willingness to make
scientific appeals. Proponents of the attitudinal model view the content of
judicial opinions as nothing more than a post hoc rationalization of a Justice’s
ideology. From this standpoint, ideology may not have any predictable relationship to the decision to cite science because science does not provide ideologically-reliable answers to social or legal problems. Justices on both the
left and the right will cite science that supports their worldview.
One fascinating new public opinion study supports the notion that individuals seek scientific information that comports with their ideological
worldview. Researchers analyzed Amazon transactions in which an individual purchased a “political” book (subsequently classified as either liberal or
conservative) and at least one other book. The study did not find Democrats
were more interested in science as a companion book purchase compared to
Republicans. In fact, science books were co-purchased at a higher rate than
any other genre. The science book purchasing habits of Democrats and Republicans were different, however, in regard to the scientific fields and perspectives within those fields they selected. In other words, it appears as
though both conservatives and liberals who enjoy reading are open to learning more about science, so long as it confirms their underlying worldview. 130

outcomes on a dependent variable is, by definition, impressionistic. Finally, Segal and Spaeth
acknowledge the attitudinal model cannot explain unanimous Supreme Court votes. Id. at 343 n.81.
Thus, their model is non-replicable in roughly thirty-six percent of Supreme Court cases every term.
Sarah Tuberville & Anthony Marcum, Those 5-to-4 Decisions on the Supreme Court? 9 to 0 Is Far
More Common., WASH. POST (June 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/06/28/those-5-4-decisions-on-the-supreme-court-9-0-is-far-more-common/.
128. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 127.
129. Id. at 86.
130. Shi et al., supra note 13. One caveat to the generalizability of this study is that it is limited
to individuals who want to learn about both politics and science. Individuals with higher levels of
political knowledge behave with much greater sophistication than less informed voters. See
MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND
WHY IT MATTERS (1996).
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On the other hand, other studies have found that conservative citizens
are less trusting of scientists in general 131 and skeptical of evidence supporting scientific issues like climate change132 and evolution. 133 One possible
causal mechanism is that differences in personality types have ideological
consequences. Compared to conservatives, liberals tend to be significantly
more open to new information and experiences, 134 one of the so-called “BigFive” personality traits. 135 Individuals with higher openness scores may trust
scientists more because they are more curious about scientific questions. Judicial politics scholars have found a similar relationship between openness
as a personality trait and liberalism among Supreme Court Justices. 136 Thus,
I predict liberal Justices will be more likely to cite science in their opinions
than conservatives (Judicial Liberalism Hypothesis).
Ideology is a product of a Justice’s demographic characteristics (for example, race, gender, religion, and age) and life experiences (for example,
economic status, education, or prior work experience). These social forces
can also exert an independent effect on judicial decisionmaking. For example, Catholic Supreme Court Justices tend to support the Catholic position on
legal issues, even after controlling for judicial ideology. 137 Judicial politics
scholars, however, have not devoted much attention to the effect of a Justice’s
undergraduate major.
Justices who have greater familiarity with the scientific method as a result of their education may feel more comfortable referencing social science
in their opinions. 138 One study found that high school math performance did
not affect what major a college student selected. 139 Rather, the presence of
negative feelings towards math made students significantly more likely to
choose a humanities major over a social science field. If a negative affect
131. Cacciatore et al., supra note 12, at 18.
132. Ana-Maria Bliuc et al., Public Division About Climate Change Rooted in Conflicting Socio-political Identities, 5 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 226–29 (2015).
133. Jonathan P. Hill, Rejecting Evolution: The Role of Religion, Education, and Social Networks, 53 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 575, 576 (2014).
134. See, e.g., Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, Personality, Childhood Experience, and Political Ideology, 36 POL. PSYCHOL. 55, 55 (2014).
135. See Lewis R. Goldberg, An Alternative “Description of Personality”: The Big-Five Factor
Structure, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1216, 1217 (1990).
136. MATTHEW E. K. HALL, WHAT JUSTICES WANT : GOALS AND PERSONALITY ON THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 47–48 (2018).
137. William Blake, God Save This Honorable Court: Religion as a Source of Judicial Policy
Preferences, 65 POL. RES. Q. 814, 814–15 (2012).
138. This would be consistent with a study that found science majors are significantly more
knowledgeable about climate change than college graduates who majored in other fields. Joanna
K. Huxster, Ximena Uribe-Zarain & Willett Kempton, Undergraduate Understanding of Climate
Change: The Influences of College Major and Environmental Group Membership on Survey
Knowledge Scores, 46 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 149, 158 (2015).
139. Yingyi Ma, Family Socioeconomic Status, Parental Involvement, and College Major
Choices—Gender, Race/Ethnic, and Nativity Patterns, 52 SOC. PERSP. 211, 222–23 (2009).
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towards math is long lasting, it could make people more reticent to engage
with quantitative scientific research later in life. The Science Major Hypothesis predicts that Justices who earned a bachelor’s degree in a scientific field
will be more likely to invoke science in their opinions than Justices who studied other subjects. 140
The following Justices, whose behavior is analyzed in Section III, completed a degree in a social science field or mathematics: 141 Samuel Alito
(Public and International Affairs), 142 Harry Blackmun (Math), 143 William
Brennan (Economics), 144 Stephen Breyer (Politics, Philosophy, and Economics), 145 William Douglas (Economics), 146 Neil Gorsuch (Political Science), 147
John Harlan (Government), 148 Anthony Kennedy (Political Science), 149 Sandra Day O’Connor (Economics), 150 Stanley Reed (Economics), 151 William
Rehnquist (Political Science), 152 Earl Warren (Political Science), 153 Byron

140. Interestingly, Ronald Reagan gave a speech in which he appeared to link the Judicial Liberalism Hypothesis and the Science Major Hypothesis. At a 1986 event in North Carolina, he stated
Democrats “allow drugs, thugs and hoodlums to pervade society by placing a bunch of sociology
majors on the bench.” Ronald J. Ostrow & James Gerstenzang, Reagan, Bork Foe in Sharp Exchange: President’s Accusation of Dishonesty Hit by Sen. Sanford as ‘Slanderous’, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 1987), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-10-15-mn-14322-story.html.
141. Justice Hugo Black is not included on this list. While he attended medical school for one
year, Justice Black did not complete his degree. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY
17 (1994).
142. Samuel Alito, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Samuel_Alito (last visited Apr. 16,
2019).
143. Paul Nelson, Blackmun, Harry A. (1908–1999), MNOPEDIA (Oct. 18, 2017),
http://www.mnopedia.org/person/blackmun-harry-1908-1999.
144. See NAT HENTOFF, LIVING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: HOW TO BE AN AUTHENTIC AMERICAN
31 (1999).
145. Caplan, supra note 10.
146. Building Upon a Legacy of Law, WHITMAN MAG. (July 2012), https://www.whitman.edu/newsroom/whitman-magazine/2012/july-2012/campaign-update/building-upon-a-legacyof-law.
147. Neil Gorsuch, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/neil_gorsuch (last visited Apr. 16,
2019).
148. E-mail from Sara Logue, Assistant Univ. Archivist for Pub. Servs., Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ. (Mar. 19, 2019) (on file with author).
149. Anthony Kennedy Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.biography.com/law-figure/anthony-kennedy.
150. Sandra Day O’Connor, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/sandra_day_oconnor (last
visited Apr. 16, 2019).
151. Gracie Hale, Ted Gilson & Ruth Bryan, Stanley Forman Reed Papers, U. KY., https://exploreuk.uky.edu/fa/findingaid/?id=xt700000032b (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
152. William H. Rehnquist, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_h_rehnquist (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
WARREN
C.,
153. Biography
of
Earl
Warren,
EARL
https://warren.ucsd.edu/about/biography.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
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White (Economics). 154 Some of these Justices also received a bachelor’s in
a humanities field, but this does not change the coding scheme. 155
2. The Strategic Model of Judicial Decisionmaking
The strategic model of judicial decisionmaking also typically assumes
Justices are only interested in shaping legal policy, but they pursue this goal
in light of institutional constraints, the preferences of other Justices, and the
expectations of external actors. 156 For example, a Justice would need to
weigh their policy preferences against the possibility of non-compliance with
a sincerely-written opinion. Alternatively, perhaps a Justice would want to
wait until public opinion was on their side before pushing the law in a certain
direction.
Only within the last fifteen years or so did scholars begin to examine
Supreme Court opinions as potential data sources. Studies have found Justices use framing devices in their opinions to support their point of view.
Justices make strategic references to the Federalist Papers 157 and other rhetorical sources, such as Blackstone’s Commentaries, the Magna Carta, the
Declaration of Independence, and the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall. 158
They even vary in their tendencies to cite precedent 159 and amicus curiae
briefs, 160 depending on the context of a case. None of these studies, however,
has examined the conditions under which Justices reference science in their
opinions.

154. CU-Boulder Chancellor, President, Law School Dean Laud Scholar-Athlete Byron White,
CU BOULDER TODAY (Apr. 14, 2002), https://www.colorado.edu/today/2002/04/14/cu-boulderchancellor-president-law-school-dean-laud-scholar-athlete-byron-white.
155. For example, Justice Breyer received an A.B. in philosophy from Harvard in addition to
his PPE degree from Oxford. Caplan, supra note 10.
156. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) (“[J]ustices may
be primarily seekers of legal policy, but they are not unconstrained actors who make decisions based
only on their own ideological attitudes.”). More recent scholarship has acknowledged Justices have
multiple goals, like job satisfaction. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RATIONAL CHOICE (2013). Describing their earlier account of the strategic model Epstein and
Knight admitted, “We were wrong. . . . [Policy] is not the only motivation; it may not even be dominant for many judges.” Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 11, 12 (2013).
157. Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion
Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329 (2005).
158. Robert J. Hume, The Use of Rhetorical Sources by the U.S. Supreme Court, 40 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 817, 822–24 (2006).
159. Yonatan Lupu & James H. Fowler, Strategic Citations to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (2013).
160. Paul M. Collins Jr., Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 5 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 143 (2008).
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Science offers a tool to persuade other Justices or make an opinion seem
more legitimate in the eyes of external actors. In particular, science can disguise the ideological conclusion the author reaches because science provides
non-ideological reasoning. Citing science also puts Justices on the opposing
side of the case in the uncomfortable position of refuting the scientific evidence or denying its relevance. Thus, I predict that Justices will be more
likely to cite science in opinions that are consistent with their ideology (Ideological Polarization Hypothesis).
The salience of a particular case also shapes how Justices write their
opinions. References to the Federalist Papers and other rhetorical sources
occur more frequently in cases in which the Court strikes down a law, overturns a precedent, or decides cases with a closely divided vote. Justices may
feel the need to leverage as many arguments as they can in more important
cases. This may explain why scholars have found Supreme Court opinions
are significantly longer in salient cases, which they define as those reported
on the front page of the New York Times. 161
Three notable examples illustrate the connection between long opinions
and making appeals to science. Justice Breyer referenced relevant scientific
evidence in an appendix following his dissenting opinion in United States v.
Lopez (citing 123 non-governmental studies and reports connecting school
violence to economic productivity), 162 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Ass’n (citing 150 peer-reviewed studies outlining the psychological risks to
children posed by violent video games), 163 and McDonald v. City of Chicago 164 (citing seven peer-reviewed studies on the public safety threats posed
by gun ownership). In two of these cases, Lopez 165 and McDonald, 166 Justice
Breyer read his dissent from the bench, which is a signal of a Justice’s profound disagreement with the majority. 167 Prior scholarship has found that
dissenting from the bench frequently occurs in salient cases. 168
Thus, the Case Salience Hypothesis predicts that Justices are significantly more likely to reference social science studies in more important cases.

161. Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 648, 657–58, 665, 674 (2008). For an analysis of why
making the front page of the New York Times constitutes a valid measure of case salience, see Lee
Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000).
162. 514 U.S. 549, 631–44 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. 564 U.S. 786, 858–72 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. 561 U.S. 742, 941–44 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. United States v. Lopez, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1260 (last visited Apr.
23, 2019).
166. McDonald v. Chicago, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1521 (last visited Apr
23, 2019).
167. William D. Blake & Hans J. Hacker, “The Brooding Spirit of the Law”: Supreme Court
Justices Reading Dissents from the Bench, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 2 (2010).
168. Id. at 9.
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In my analysis, I operationalize salience using several criteria: cases involving judicial review, holding a law unconstitutional, overturning a precedent,
being decided by a closely divided vote, receiving heavier media coverage, 169
or featuring a larger number of amicus briefs. 170
3. The Legal Model of Judicial Decisionmaking
The legal model of judicial behavior is usually portrayed as a straw man
against which attitudinalists can claim the empirical high ground. 171 For example, in the first chapter of The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited, political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth use the word
“naïve” four times to characterize the notion that Supreme Court Justices are
not policymakers. 172 Subsequent quantitative political science scholarship
has taken the legal model more seriously, uncovering evidence that legal doctrine constrains judicial ideology.
Political scientists Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman find evidence
that stare decisis constrains every member of the Court. This commitment is
even higher among Justices with prior judicial experience. The Justices also
defer to the elected branches, but many times it is not out of fear of retaliation,
but a normative concern for a properly limited judicial role. 173 Another study
finds appellate court judges act much less ideologically when citing binding
precedent than nonbinding precedents set by different circuits. 174 In other
words, appellate judges seek out arguments from other circuits that support
their worldview when they can, but when they must follow binding precedent
that goes against their worldview, they do so.
Other scholars have found Supreme Court cases that provide more legal
certainty are more likely to be decided unanimously. 175 If scientific evidence,
like that provided in the Brandeis Brief, can provide more information, and

169. See Richard L. Pacelle Jr. et al., Assessing the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Roberts Court, 99 SOC. SCI. Q. 1253 (2018).
170. See Ryan Salzman, Christopher J. Williams & Bryan T. Calvin, The Determinants of the
Number of Amicus Briefs Filed Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-2001, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 293
(2011).
171. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4
LAW & CTS. NEWSLETTER 6 (1994), http://lawcourts.org/pubs/newsletter/spring94.pdf (last visited
Aug. 25, 2019); Rogers M. Smith, Symposium: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4
LAW & CTS. NEWSLETTER 8 (1994), http://lawcourts.org/pubs/newsletter/spring94.pdf (last visited
Aug. 25, 2019).
172. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 127, at 7–8.
173. See MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT : LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 8–11 (2011).
174. Rachael K. Hinkle, Legal Constraint in the US Courts of Appeals, 77 J. POL. 721, 722
(2015).
175. See PAMELA C. CORLEY, AMY STEIGERWALT & ARTEMUS WARD , THE PUZZLE OF
UNANIMITY: CONSENSUS ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 12 (2013).
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therefore clarity, science may moderate the influence of ideology on decisionmaking. 176 Justices are also more likely to write separately to explain a
counter-attitudinal vote. 177 In other words, if a liberal Justice casts a conservative vote, she is more likely to write a concurring or dissenting opinion
to indicate why. Citing science may be a useful tool in such opinions. The
Ideological Moderation Hypothesis thus predicts the opposite of the Ideological Polarization Hypothesis—Justices will be less likely to make appeals to
science when they write opinions consistent with their ideology.
B. Data and Summary Statistics
To test these hypotheses, I created an original dataset of Supreme Court
citations to social science from 1954 to 2018. I generated the data using a
series of targeted searches of the Westlaw database, which I then merged with
the Supreme Court Database. 178 The data attempts to capture as many journal
articles and books as possible within the following academic disciplines: anthropology, economics, education, geography, linguistics, psychiatry, psychology, political science, public health, social work, and sociology. I recognize many academic disciplines in the natural sciences produce research
that is relevant to Supreme Court cases, and that analysis will be conducted
in a future version of this project.
The Bluebook, while infuriating, 179 creates a predictable method of
searching for books and journal articles cited in judicial opinions. According
to The Bluebook rules, the title of the book or journal occurs shortly before
the year of publication. To assist in my searches for publication titles and
years of publication, I used wildcard searches on Westlaw, which capture
variations of words with a common stem. For example, searching “19!” will
return all numbers starting with “19”, capturing hits from 1900 to 1999. This
term will locate scientific studies published in the twentieth century.
My search protocols also assume many journal and book titles within a
discipline include the name of that discipline. Wildcard searches help here,
too. Searching Westlaw for “pol!” will capture the words “politics,” “political,” and “policy,” all of which help identify book and journal titles within
political science. As a robustness check, I cross-referenced the search terms
against a database of every journal in each discipline. On average, the search
terms successfully identified 59% of journals per scientific field. The results
of this analysis and other information about data collection are available in
the Appendix.
176. See supra Section I.A.
177. See Paul M. Collins, Cognitive Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. Q.
362, 371 (2011).
178. Modern Database, SUPREME COURT DATABASE http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
179. See Richard A. Posner, The Bluebook Blues, 120 YALE L.J. 850, 858 (2011).
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Table 1 provides an overview of how frequently Supreme Court opinions cite at least one study from each discipline in the sample. As displayed
in Table 1, political science is the most commonly cited social science discipline, while there are no references to social work or linguistics studies. The
latter non-finding is particularly intriguing because originalism developed in
part as a reaction to trends in linguistic scholarship. 180
TABLE 1. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES, BY
DISCIPLINE
Discipline

Opinions

Anthropology

2

Economics

35

Education

8

Geography

4

Linguistics

0

Political Science

83

Psychiatry

28

Psychology

40

Public Health

13

Social Work

0

Sociology

19

The overall number of opinions citing science is very low when one
considers the Justices wrote 16,420 opinions during this time frame. By contrast, the Harvard Law Review and Yale Law Journal have each been cited in
more than one thousand Supreme Court cases since the dawn of the Warren
Court. 181
Table 2 summarizes which Justices are more likely to reference science.
Justice Brennan cited at least one social science study in twenty of his opinions, more than any other Justice in the sample. In terms of percentage of
opinions that make appeals to science, however, Justice Stephen Breyer leads
180. Jesse Pearson,
Bryan Garner, VICE (Nov.
30, 2010, 7:00
PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5g53bd/bryan-garner-641-v17n12 (quoting Garner, who coauthored two books about originalism with Justice Antonin Scalia, saying, “And there is a view
among some inane linguists that says that we shouldn’t be teaching nonstandard speakers the standard dialect—that it’s simply the dialect of the people in power. Instead, we should be teaching
everyone to be accepting of linguistic differences.”).
181. Specifically, the Harvard Law Review has been cited at least once in 1,006 Supreme Court
cases, while the Yale Law Journal has at least one citation in 1,019 cases. These figures would be
significantly higher if I went through and tallied citations in individual opinions, like I counted
references to social science studies.
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the pack. As mentioned earlier, both Justice Brennan and Justice Breyer received undergraduate degrees in social science fields. 182
Seven Justices did not cite social science in any of their opinions. Aside
from Justice Black, these Justices served on the Court for only a few terms
covered in the sample. Another interesting finding in Table 2 is that Chief
Justices appear much less likely to rely on scientific evidence compared to
associate Justices. Only Chief Justice Burger cited science in at least one
percent of his opinions. As mentioned earlier, Chief Justice Warren appealed
to science only once—in Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education. 183
TABLE 2. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES, BY
JUSTICE
Justice

Opinions

Percentage

Breyer

16

3.0

Sotomayor

5

2.8

Kennedy

16

2.6

Alito

5

1.8

Blackmun

15

1.7

Brennan

20

1.6

Ginsburg

7

1.6

Souter

6

1.6

White

17

1.5

Burger

6

1.2

Stewart

10

1.2

Thomas

8

1.2

Douglas

10

1.0

Stevens

16

1.0

Goldberg

1

0.9

Marshall

9

0.9

Scalia

8

0.9

Kagan

1

0.8

Fortas

1

0.7

Rehnquist

7

0.7

Frankfurter

2

0.6

182. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Section I.B.
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Harlan

5

0.6

Powell

5

0.6

Roberts

1

0.6

Clark

2

0.5

O’Connor

3

0.5

Warren

1

0.3

Black

0

0.0

Burton

0

0.0

Gorsuch

0

0.0

Jackson

0

0.0

Minton

0

0.0

Reed

0

0.0

Whitaker

0

0.0
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Table 3 reviews the legal issues considered in cases that cite science and
compares them to the Supreme Court’s overall docket. On some issues, for
example cases involving unions or criminal procedure, appeals to science occur at a lower rate than one would expect given how frequently they come
before the Court. On many other issues, including civil rights, the First
Amendment, due process, and privacy, Justices make scientific references at
a higher rate than they appear on the docket.
TABLE 3. LEGAL ISSUE IN CASES WITH OPINIONS CITING SCIENTIFIC
STUDIES
Issue Area

Cases

Sample %

Docket %

Criminal Procedure

29

16.3

25.5

Civil Rights

48

27.6

17.3

First Amendment

29

17.7

10.9

Due Process

12

5.9

4.1

Privacy

22

4.9

1.9

Attorneys

2

0.5

1.3

Unions

1

2.0

3.8

Economic Activity

30

13.8

18.0

Judicial Power

13

6.9

9.8

Federalism

12

3.5

4.1

Miscellaneous

2

1.0

0.1
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While the descriptive statistics above reveal interesting patterns in the
data, they do not tell the whole story. The next Section tests each hypothesis
developed in Section II.A. Multivariate analyses highlight which Justicelevel, opinion-level, and case-level factors play a significant role in the relationship between science and Supreme Court opinion-writing.
III. ANALYZING THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE ON SUPREME COURT
BEHAVIOR
This Section presents two multivariate regression analyses. The first,
presented in Table 4, tests the conditions under which an opinion is more
likely to cite at least one scientific study and tests the Science Major Hypothesis, the Judicial Liberalism Hypothesis, and the Case Salience Hypothesis.
The second multivariate analysis, displayed in Table 5, examines the interplay between the use of science, judicial ideology, and the ideological direction of judicial opinions. These regressions provide tests for the Ideological
Moderation and Ideological Polarization Hypotheses.
A. Methods and Variables
The dependent variable in the first regression analysis is whether a given
Supreme Court opinion cites at least one scientific study. The dichotomous
nature of the dependent variable makes logistic regression an appropriate
method. However, logistic regression assumes positive and negative outcomes are equally likely to occur. Very few Supreme Court opinions cite
scientific studies, so traditional logistic regression may create biased results.
Therefore, instead, the analysis employs the Firth logistic regression program
in Stata, which uses penalized maximum likelihood coefficients to estimate
rare events. 184
The dependent variable in the second regression is also dichotomous:
whether a Supreme Court opinion supports the liberal position in a given
case. Because a Justice’s ideology is strongly correlated with the ideological
directions of their opinions, ordinary logistic regression could create biased
coefficients. 185 Consequently, instead, each model in Table 5 uses multilevel
logistic regression with a random intercept for each Justice.
The analyses employ judicial common space scores as measures of Judicial Ideology, with higher values indicating more conservative Justices. 186
The Science Major variable is a dichotomous measure of whether a Justice
184. See Rainer Puhr et al., Firth’s Logistic Regression with Rare Events: Accurate Effect Estimates and Predictions?, 36 STAT. IN MED. 2302, 2302 (2017).
185. See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2007).
186. See Epstein et al., supra note 11, at 318–20.

2019]

“DON’T CONFUSE ME WITH THE FACTS”

245

has at least one bachelor’s degree in math, any natural science, or social science. Judicial Review Case is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of
one if at least one of the authorities for the Court’s decision involved federal
or state judicial review. The Declared Unconstitutional variable measures
whether the Court struck down a federal or state law, either in part or in its
entirety.
The Divided Court variable measures the inverse of the size of the majority coalition in a given case. In other words, a case decided 9-0 takes the
value of negative nine, whereas a case decided 5-4 is recorded as negative
one. I used the Supreme Court Database to build variables that differentiate
between Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions. The database also
contains a variable that reflects whether the majority opinion in the case in
question formally altered precedent. I merged data from other scholars to
measure the total number of amicus curiae briefs submitted for each case 187
and a Case Salience Index based on the breadth of media coverage generated
by each case. 188 I also utilized the Supreme Court Database to construct a
dichotomous Administrative Agency Case variable, which measures whether
the case originated at an administrative hearing or proceeding. These cases
may be more technical in nature and require scientific evidence to decide
them. 189
B. Regression Analysis of Citing Science in an Opinion
Table 4 presents the results of two Firth logistic regression models predicting the circumstances under which a Supreme Court opinion is likely to
cite at least one scientific study. In Model 1, judicial ideology exerts a statistically significant effect in the predicted direction, confirming the Judicial

187. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Data, U. MASS. AMHERST : P AUL M. COLLINS, JR.,
https://blogs.umass.edu/pmcollins/data/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019); e-mail from John M. Scheb,
Professor of Political Sci., Univ. Tenn. (Mar. 18, 2019) (on file with author). Dr. Scheb is one of
the co-authors of the study. Pacelle et al., supra note 169.
188. Todd Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience Index 1953-2014 Terms, HARVARD
DATAVERSE
(2016),
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/UR2KYE (last visited Apr. 29, 2019). The additive index ranges from zero
to eight based on the case’s presence in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times,
and Washington Post. If one of those newspapers covers the case, it is recorded as one, but if it
receives front-page coverage it is coded as two.
189. For example, Verizon questioned whether the FCC had the power to require state utility
commissions to set rates on a forward-looking basis. Verizon Commc’ns v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467,
475 (2002). Before the case could reach the Supreme Court in 2002, the dispute began with a 1994
FCC order. Admin. N. Am. Numbering Plan, 9 FCC Rcd. 2068, (Apr. 4, 1994). The F.C.C. calculated rates based on a defined “cost,” abandoning the old fair-value approach. See, e.g., Verizon
Commc’ns, 535 U.S. at 484 (citing ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND INSTITUTIONS 40–41 (1988)).
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Liberalism Hypothesis. 190 Figure 1 visualizes this finding—liberal Justices
are more likely to cite scientific studies than conservative Justices.
TABLE 4. PENALIZED MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD LOGISTIC REGRESSION
MODEL OF OPINIONS CITING SCIENCE
Predictor

Model 1

Model 2

Judicial Ideology

-0.377***
(0.139)
0.306**
(0.145)
0.929***
(0.171)
0.752***
(0.175)
0.732***
(0.258)
0.096***
(0.028)
0.056
(0.168)
-0.937***
(0.217)
-0.445***
(0.161)
0.021***
(0.004)

Constant

-46.618***
(8.901)

-0.470***
(0.149)
0.305**
(0.154)
0.662***
(0.183)
0.392**
(0.192)
0.191
(0.310)
0.041
(0.029)
0.035
(0.176)
-1.049***
(0.226)
-0.534***
(0.175)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.218***
(0.036)
0.014***
(0.005)
-38.780***
(10.326)

Observations
χ2

16,411
165.9***

14,535
180.7***

Science Major
Judicial Review Case
Declared Unconstitutional
Altered Precedent
Divided Court
Administrative Agency Case
Concurring Opinion
Dissenting Opinion
Term
Case Salience Index
Amicus Curiae Briefs

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
190. The consensus in political science is that a p-value of less than 0.10 is required to describe
a finding as statistically significant, although p-values of less than 0.05 provide stronger evidence
that the result is not due to chance.
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The results indicate a one standard deviation change from the mean ideology in the liberal direction increases the predicted probability of invoking
science by 17.2%. Model 1 also supports the Science Major Hypothesis.
Justices who studied a scientific discipline as an undergraduate are 35.4%
more
likely
than
others
to
cite
social
science.
PROBABILITY

.015
.01
.005
0

Pr(Cite Science)

.02

FIGURE 1. THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY ON THE
OF CITING SOCIAL SCIENCE

Far Left

-1 S.D.

Average

+1 S.D.

Far Right

Judicial Ideology
The evidence for the Case Salience Hypothesis is also quite strong. Scientific studies are 3.5 times more likely to be referenced in cases involving
judicial review than other case types. If the Court strikes down the law in
question, the probability a Justice will reference social science increases by
an additional factor of 2.1. If the Court alters a previous precedent, regardless
of whether the case involves constitutional or statutory interpretation, the
likelihood of an opinion making a scientific appeal doubles. Justices are
more likely to cite science in cases when the Court is more sharply divided.
As the size of the majority coalition shrinks by one standard deviation from
the mean (from roughly a four-vote majority coalition to a roughly two-vote
majority coalition), the likelihood of finding a scientific citation increases by
31.6%.
Model 2 of Table 4 adds two additional variables to those analyzed in
Model 1: the number of amicus curiae briefs submitted and the Case Salience
Index, which measures a case’s level of media exposure. The number of
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observations is smaller than Model 1 because the authors who calculated the
amicus brief data and Case Salience Index could not find data for every case.
The results across the models remain similar, although the Alteration of Precedent and Divided Court variables are no longer statistically significant.
However, the two new variables in Model 2 are statistically significant,
providing additional support for the Case Salience Hypothesis.
A one standard deviation change in the Case Salience Index increases
the probability of a Justice citing science by 63.9%. Figure 2 displays this
relationship. A similar finding occurs when more amici participate in a case.
When the total number of amicus briefs increases by one standard deviation
(7.4) from its mean (3.9), a Justice becomes 10.6% more likely to make a
scientific appeal. While it is beyond the scope of this current study, it is likely
that amicus briefs, like the one the NAACP submitted in Brown, provide the
Court with relevant social science research they can choose to cite.

.02
.01
0

Pr(Cite Science)

.03

FIGURE 2. THE EFFECT OF CASE SALIENCE ON THE PROBABILITY OF CITING
SOCIAL SCIENCE

0

1

2

3

4

5

Case Salience Index

6

7

8
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The control variables also yield interesting findings, based on the results
of Model 1. The likelihood of an opinion citing science increases by an average of 2.1% each term. 191 Cases originating with administrative agency
proceedings, however, are no more or less likely to produce opinions citing
science. Authors of concurring opinions are 60.4% less likely to make scientific appeals, compared to majority opinions. 192 Dissenting opinions are
also 35.6% less likely to cite science. Citing science in a majority opinion
may have more utility than in a concurrence or a dissent. As Robert Hume
theorized, referencing unifying historical rhetoric “can hold together a majority coalition or encourage a wavering Justice to sign on.” 193 This same
dynamic may be at play when it comes to citing scientific studies.
C. Regression Analysis of the Ideological Effect of Citing Science in
Supreme Court Opinions
The analysis displayed in Table 5 measures the effect of Judicial Ideology and the decision to cite science on the ideological direction of an opinion. These models contain interaction terms between the two independent
variables to analyze the degree to which citing science and judicial policy
preferences jointly co-vary. 194 This modeling strategy provides a test for the
Ideological Polarization and Ideological Moderation Hypotheses. Evidence
that a liberal Justice is less likely to write a liberal opinion (or a conservative
Justice, a conservative opinion) that cites science would support the Ideological Moderation Hypothesis.
Instead, the results are the opposite and provide evidence for the Ideological Polarization Hypothesis. The probability of a Justice on the Court’s
far left writing a liberal opinion is 0.117 higher when they invoke science.
Similarly, citing science increases the probability that a Justice on the Court’s
far-right will write a conservative opinion by 0.113. Figure 3 displays the
results of Model 1. 195

191. The coefficients in logistic regression models do not directly indicate what impact a oneunit change of an independent variable will have on the probability of the dependent variable being
one. Instead, all reported effect sizes are based on the calculations of predicted probabilities, holding all other covariates at their means.
192. Majority opinions are omitted from Table 4 because they serve as the reference category
against which the analysis measures the effect of writing a Concurring or Dissenting Opinion.
193. Hume, supra note 158, at 818.
194. One cannot conclude from the results displayed in Table 5 that a statistically significant
interaction term provides evidence for the Ideological Polarization or Ideological Moderation Hypotheses. Instead, statistical significance must be calculated across a range of relevant values (in
this case different levels of Judicial Liberalism). See Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark &
Matt Golder, Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL.
ANALYSIS 63, 64 (2006). Table A2 of the Appendix reports these individual calculations of statistical significance.
195. These polarizing differences at every data point, save for the Court’s mean ideology, are
statistically significant. See the Appendix for more details.
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TABLE 5. MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL OF OPINION
DIRECTION WITH JUSTICE-LEVEL RANDOM INTERCEPTS
Predictor
Judicial Ideology

Model 1

-1.431***
(0.073)
Cites Study
0.066
(0.167)
Cites Study*Ideology -0.895**
(0.380)
Constant
0.193***
(0.042)
Random Intercept
0.040***
(0.015)

Model 2
-2.476***
(0.185)
0.197
(0.427)
-2.645**
(1.271)
-0.028
(0.148)
0.613***
(0.186)

Observations
16,168
5,958
Number of groups
34
34
3.5***
185.4***
χ2
63.4***
272.4***
LR χ2
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10

Model 2 examines only dissenting opinions, and the results provide even
stronger evidence of polarization. The probability that a Justice who is one
standard deviation more liberal than the Court’s average will write a liberal
opinion increases by 0.150 when they cite science. If a Justice one-standard
deviation more conservative than the mean cites science, the probability they
will write a conservative opinion increases by 0.148. Figure 4 displays these
results. 196
These findings are even more impressive in light of the “floor and ceiling effects” in these models. Each of the four figures in the Article have a yaxis that measures a predicted probability that ranges from zero to one, the
equivalent range of zero to one hundred percent. Overall, a Justice at the
Court’s far left wing will write a liberal dissent about eighty-seven percent
of the time. A Justice on the far right, by contrast, will write a liberal dissent
fourteen percent of the time. Considering how close these values are to the
top and bottom of the y-axis scale (the ceiling and floor), there is not much
room for a Justice at either extreme to become more ideological in her decisionmaking. And yet, when a Justice on the far left or right cites science in

196. At every point displayed in Figure 4, except for the Court’s mean ideology, citing science
exerts a statistically significant, polarizing effect. See the Appendix for more information on the
size of these effects.
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a dissent, they are even more likely to do so in an ideologically-congruous
opinion.

FIGURE 3. THE EFFECT OF CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES IN ALL OPINIONS
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FIGURE 4. THE EFFECT OF CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES IN DISSENTING
OPINIONS
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The polarizing effect of citing science in a dissenting opinion may reflect a Justice’s desire to persuade the public, other external actors, or a future
Supreme Court that the majority opinion was not just wrong as a matter of
law but also a distortion of objective reality. Dissenting opinions, according
to Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, represent “an appeal to the brooding
spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may
possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court
to have been betrayed.” 197 Science can provide additional evidence that the
Court had erred.
IV. CONCLUSION
The findings discussed in this Article, while preliminary, suggest the
Court faces significant obstacles in how it uses science. Justices very rarely
make appeals to science, although those who majored in a scientific discipline are more likely to do so. Across several different measures of case
salience, the results consistently demonstrate that scientific appeals occur
more frequently in more prominent cases. When the Justices do invoke science, other normatively troubling patterns emerge. Liberal Justices are more
likely to cite science than conservative Justices. The decision to cite science
is one that polarizes Justices on the Court’s left and right. Rather than letting
scientific knowledge mitigate a Justice’s ideological proclivities, the data indicate Justices on both ends of the spectrum resort to scientific arguments to
bolster their underlying worldviews.
Future research is needed to see if these findings generalize to references
to other academic disciplines, especially in the natural sciences. While this
study attempts to document the output of scientific information in judicial
opinions, it does not provide insight into how the Justices find scientific information. Do the Justices conduct literature reviews on their own or with
their clerks? Alternatively, do Justices only cite science when a brief provides a potential reference? I hope to address this in future research, along
with refining the search protocols and identifying a way to measure whether
a Justice cites science positively or negatively.
Further research is also needed because of the high stakes involved in
the use, non-use, or misuse of science in judicial opinions. Sometimes, the
Court creates legal controversy when it relies on poorly-designed scientific
research, as the debate about Footnote 11 in Brown exemplifies. 198 Judges,
such as the one tasked with desegregating the Washington, D.C. public
schools, may throw up their hands in frustration when encountering scientific

197. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1936).
198. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
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research they do not understand. 199 Even ostensibly pro-science Justices
might misstate scientific conclusions, as Justice Brennan did in Craig v.
Boren. 200
Sometimes, the consequences of judicial reliance on substandard research are insidious and long-lasting. The racist pseudo-science comparing
the brains of white and black Americans provided a veneer of objectivity to
segregationist legal precedents that lasted more than a half century. 201 Junk
science also muddled Eighth Amendment debates over execution methods.
Most states eventually abandoned the electric chair, but nine states still allow
death by electrocution as a “backup” method to lethal injection. 202 The
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Kemmler still stands, and only two
state supreme courts (Georgia 203 and Nebraska 204) have leveraged modern
scientific research to strike down electrocution as being unconstitutionally
cruel. Thus, more than a century later, junk science undergirds Eighth
Amendment doctrine in most of the United States.
We might excuse ordinary citizens who engage in partisan-motivated
reasoning when it comes to their attitudes towards science, but perhaps citizens should expect more from their judges, especially when correctly interpreting top-flight social scientific research can inform the Court on any number of legal issues. Even if a Justice feels overwhelmed, scientific
associations frequently submit amicus briefs, which break down complex scientific concepts into more digestible language. 205 If a Justice remains befud-

199. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 105–115 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
202. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution (last visited Aug. 23,
2019).
203. Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 144 (Ga. 2001) (“The Legislature’s adoption of lethal
injection as the exclusive method for executing the death penalty in Georgia reflects societal consensus that the ‘science of the present day’ has provided a less painful, less barbarous means for
taking the life of condemned prisoners.”).
204. State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 266 (Neb. 2008) (“Scientific knowledge about electricity
and its effects on the human body has vastly expanded since 1913, when the Nebraska Legislature
first selected electrocution over hanging.”).
205. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, DIVISION OFFICERS HANDBOOK App. IV
(Rev. ed. 2003), https://www.apa.org/about/division/officers/handbook/index?item=17 (“If participation as amicus curiae is approved, the Office of General Counsel will undertake preparation of
the brief. . . . Appropriate experts in the field will be consulted in the course of drafting the
brief . . . .”). Once again, the American Political Science Association is an unfortunate exception.
Although individual political scientists have sometimes written amicus briefs, the Association itself
has only joined one brief in the last fifteen years. American Political Science Association, APSA
Public Statements and Letters, https://www.apsanet.org/ABOUT/APSA-Public-Statements-andLetters (last visited May 4, 2019).
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dled, they may consult a Supreme Court Fellow, hired for their scientific research skills. 206 In short, even if a case seems full of “gobbledygook,” a conscientious Supreme Court Justice has tools available to make sense of social
science.

206. See Fellowship Placements, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/fellows/fellowships.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (“The Federal
Judicial Center is the education and research agency for the federal judiciary. It provides orientation
and continuing education for all federal judges . . . on specific subjects, such as patent law, scientific
evidence, or arbitration, and empirically based studies in judicial reform. . . . The Fellow serving
at the Federal Judicial Center supports the Center’s research and educational activities . . . .” (emphases added)).
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APPENDIX
To contextualize the data presented in Table 1, I do not attempt to count
how many studies within a given discipline one opinion cites. However, if
the same opinion cites studies from multiple disciplines, I count the opinion
in both scientific fields. I consulted the websites of many interdisciplinary
journals to attempt to identify if there was a dominant discipline. The sample
does not include any law reviews, including interdisciplinary law reviews.
The following is an example of my search protocols. The term
OP(Politic! +5 19!) searches each opinion (thus excluding the case’s headnotes) for any word beginning with the letters “Politic” (like Politics or Political) followed (within five words) by any number beginning with 19 (like
1995). This term should capture studies published in most political science
journals in the twentieth century, and tweaking the search term to OP(Pol!
+5 20!) should uncover twenty-first-century studies.
To test the thoroughness of my search terms, I downloaded a list of
every journal within each social science discipline listed in the Journal Citation Reports database. 207 Table A1 reports the percentage of journals within
each academic field that would be captured by the corresponding Westlaw
search term.
TABLE A1. ACCURACY OF WESTLAW SEARCH TERMS
Discipline

% Journals
Included

Anthropology

36

Economics

75

Education

67

Geography

58

Linguistics

41

Political Science

53

Psychiatry

61

Psychology

68

Public Health

49

Social Work

71

Sociology

70

207. Journal
Citation
Reports,
CLARIVATE
ANALYTICS,
https://clarivate.com/webofsciencegroup/solutions/journal-citation-reports/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2019).
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Table A2 contextualizes the effect size and statistical significance of the
interaction term between judicial ideology and citing science analyzed in Table 5.
TABLE A2. MARGINAL EFFECT OF CITING SCIENTIFIC STUDIES ON
WRITING A LIBERAL OPINION, BY IDEOLOGY (USING THE TABLE 5 MODELS)
Model 1

Model 2

Ideology

M.E.

p

M.E.

P

Far Left

0.117

0.000

0.110

0.000

-1 S.D.

0.104

0.013

0.150

0.026

Average

-0.011

0.792

-0.031

0.440

+1 S.D.

-0.130

0.005

-0.148

0.000

Far Right

-0.145

0.000

-0.116

0.000

Liberal (Avg.)
Conservative
(Avg.)

0.105

0.012

0.152

0.015

-0.113

0.015

-0.145

0.023

